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Several countries, especially the United States, along with international entities, have imposed numerous sanctions on Iran. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which led to extensive sanctions on Russia, Iran was the most sanctioned country in the world. 

The United States first imposed sanctions on Iran in November 1979 after radical students seized the American Embassy in Tehran and took hostages. These sanctions were lifted in January 1981 following the hostages’ release but were reinstated in 1987 due to Iran’s actions against U.S. and other vessels in the Persian Gulf and its support for terrorism. In 1995, the sanctions were expanded to include firms dealing with the Iranian government. 

In December 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran through Security Council Resolution 1737 after Iran failed to comply with Resolution 1696, which demanded a halt to its uranium enrichment program. Initially, U.S. sanctions targeted investments in oil, gas, and petrochemicals, exports of refined petroleum products, and business dealings with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), extending to banking and insurance transactions, shipping, web-hosting services for commercial endeavors, and domain name registration services. Subsequent UN Resolutions further expanded sanctions against Iran. 

The fourth set of U.S. sanctions came into effect in November 2018. The White House stated that the goal was not to change the regime but to pressure Iran into altering its regional policies, ceasing support for regional militant groups, and ending its ballistic missile program. In September 2019, a U.S. official announced that sanctions would be imposed on anyone who dealt with Iran or purchased its oil. Later that month, in response to a suspected Iranian attack on key Saudi Arabian oil facilities, President Trump directed the Treasury Department to “substantially increase” sanctions on Iran, targeting the Iranian national bank. A senior Trump administration official noted that these new sanctions specifically targeted the financial assets of the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. However, according to The New York Times, Tehran denied any involvement in the attacks on the Saudi oil facilities. 

In late 2019, the U.S. Treasury imposed several sanctions on Iranian and Iran-backed entities. On November 22, Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, Iran’s communications minister, was sanctioned for internet censorship following protests against a fuel price hike. On December 6, three Iran-backed Iraqi militia leaders were sanctioned for their roles in killing protestors in Iraq. On December 11, the U.S. targeted three Iranian transportation companies and a weapons smuggling network for aiding Iran’s WMD programs and supporting the Qods Force. Finally, on December 19, two judges from Iran’s Revolutionary Court were sanctioned for human rights abuses, including sentencing political prisoners to death in show trials. 

In 2020, the U.S. imposed a series of sanctions on Iran targeting various sectors and individuals. President Trump authorized sanctions on Iran’s construction, manufacturing, textiles, and mining sectors, while blacklisting senior officials after Iran’s missile attacks on U.S. troops. Sanctions were also placed on individuals and companies aiding Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and several companies in China and Hong Kong. Further sanctions targeted entities involved in human rights abuses, petrochemical smuggling, and arms transfers, including senior IRGC members and the Ministry of Petroleum. The U.S. also reimposed U.N. sanctions expanded measures against Iran’s financial and shipping sectors, and sanctioned Iranian judges, Guardian Council members, and entities supporting terrorism and disinformation campaigns. 

In 2021, the U.S. continued its sanctions on Iran targeting various sectors and individuals. In January, the Treasury sanctioned Iranian and foreign companies involved in steel production, Iraqi official Falih al Fayyadh for human rights abuses, and two major Iranian foundations. It also expanded sanctions on Iran’s defense and shipping industries. In March, sanctions were imposed on Houthi commanders and IRGC interrogators for human rights abuses. In May, more Houthi commanders were sanctioned. In June, sanctions were lifted on some former Iranian officials. Throughout the year, the U.S. targeted oil smuggling networks, intelligence operatives, facilitators of Hezbollah and the IRGC’s Qods Force, and entities supporting Iran’s UAV programs. Additionally, individuals and entities were sanctioned for attempting to interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election and for human rights abuses linked to the 2019 protests. 

In 2022, the U.S. and its allies imposed multiple sanctions on Iran targeting various sectors and individuals for their involvement in malign activities. In March, sanctions targeted entities supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program. In May and June, networks smuggling Iranian oil and petrochemical products were sanctioned. July and August saw further sanctions on oil smuggling networks. In September, sanctions addressed Iran’s provision of drones to Russia, cyberattacks, hacking activities, and the Morality Police for human rights abuses following the death of Mahsa Amini. October witnessed sanctions from the U.S., Canada, the EU, and the UK against entities and individuals for repressing protests, supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and censorship. November included sanctions on networks smuggling Iranian oil, and entities involved in drone exports to Russia. December saw further sanctions on Iranian officials for the crackdown on protests, with additional measures from the EU and Australia against human rights violations and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

In 2023, the U.S., Canada, the UK, the EU, and Australia imposed a series of sanctions on Iran targeting individuals, companies, and entities involved in human rights abuses, the suppression of protests, and the development and export of drones and ballistic missiles. These measures included sanctions against senior Iranian officials, Revolutionary Guard Corps members, drone and missile manufacturers, and networks facilitating oil and petrochemical sales. Additional sanctions addressed Iran’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, involvement in international terrorism, and cyber repression. This comprehensive approach aimed to curb Iran’s malign activities and support for regional and global instability. 

2024   

  • January 12th The United States sanctioned foreign companies in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates for shipping goods on behalf of the Houthis, a Yemeni militia supported by the Qods Force, the elite Iranian unit in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that funds, arms and coordinates operations of allied militias in the Middle East. 
  • January 23rd The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Hamas to disrupt the terrorist group’s financial networks. Five key figures and an entity involved in the leadership and financial networks of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are the subject of the sanctions, which will help to cut off the flow of funding that supports these terrorist groups, including from Iran. This is the third round of sanctions imposed on Hamas and PIJ by the UK following the 7 October attacks on Israel, which build on existing sanctions against the groups. 
  • January 29th The United Kingdom sanctioned 7 individuals and 1 organisation, including senior Iranian officials and members of organised criminal gangs who collaborate with the regime, in order to expose and disrupt Iran’s activities in the UK and overseas. The Iranian officials designated are members of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Unit 840, which was exposed in an ITV investigation into plots to assassinate 2 television presenters from news channel Iran International on UK soil. This plot was just the latest credible reporting of the regime’s attempt to intimidate or kill British nationals or UK-linked individuals, with at least 15 such threats taking place since January 2022. 
  • January 31st The United States imposed financial sanctions on an individual and three entities that were part of a network that helped fund the operations of the Qods Force, as well as Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia. 
  • February 2nd The United States sanctioned six Iranian officials for cyber-attacks in the United States and other countries. The Treasury Department cited the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command and five senior officials. 
  • February 2nd The United States sanctioned a network that supplied materials and technology for Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs. The new sanctions followed the attack on Jan. 28, 2024, on a U.S. outpost in northeast Jordan along the border abutting Syria and Iraq. Three American soldiers were killed, and 47 were injured in an explosion caused by what appeared to be an Iranian-made Shahed series drone, according to U.S. officials. 
  • February 14th The United States sanctioned three Iranian men and four companies for smuggling U.S. goods and technology from American companies to the Central Bank of Iran and other users in the Islamic Republic. The Central Bank of Iran had previously been sanctioned for providing financial support to the Qods Force as well as Hezbollah. Some of the illegally exported items were subject to national security and anti-terrorism controls by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. 
  • February 23rd The United States sanctioned Iranian and Russian companies involved in transferring munitions as well as parts, components and materials for suicide drones. Moscow has increased its capacity to manufacture Iranian-designed suicide drones. The Treasury and State Departments announced the new sanctions on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 
  • February 27th The United States sanctioned two companies that shipped more than $100 million in Iranian goods to businesses in China on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Defense. The Panama-flagged Kohana was on its way to China when the Treasury Department made the announcement. 
  • February 27th The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned the deputy commander of the Qods Force, the external operations branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and a member of the Houthi rebel group in Yemen. The U.S. Treasury also designated the owner and operator of a ship that transported goods sold to support the Houthis and the Qods Force. 
  • February 29th The United States sanctioned four Iran-based operatives and a financial facilitator for the al Ashtar Brigades, an Iran-backed group committed to overthrowing Bahrain’s government. 
  • March 7th Canada listed 2 individuals involved in activities that gravely threaten international peace and security or that constitute gross and systemic human rights violations. 
  • March 20th The United States sanctioned three networks that supplied materials and goods to Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear and defense programs. The networks were based in Iran, Turkey, Oman, and Germany. 
  • April 4th The United States sanctioned Oceanlink Maritime DMCC, a shipping company, for smuggling on behalf of Iran’s military and defense ministry. The shipments of Iranian goods were worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 
  • April 17th At the special European Council of 17-18 April 2024, EU leaders strongly and unequivocally condemned Iran’s attack on Israel and reiterated its full solidarity with the people of Israel and commitment to Israel’s security and regional stability. The EU announced that it will take further restrictive measures against Iran, notably in relation to unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and missiles, 
  • April 18th United States in response to Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel on April 13, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted 16 individuals and two entities enabling Iran’s UAV production, including engine types that power Iran’s Shahed variant UAVs, which were used in the April 13 attack. These actors work on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its UAV production arm, Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), and other Iranian manufacturers of UAVs and UAV engines. OFAC also designated five companies in multiple jurisdictions providing component materials for steel production to Iran’s Khuzestan Steel Company (KSC), one of Iran’s largest steel producers, or purchasing KSC’s finished steel products. Iran’s metals sector generates the equivalent of several billion dollars in revenue annually, with the majority coming from steel exports.  OFAC also sanctioned three subsidiaries of Iranian automaker Bahman Group, which have continued to materially support the IRGC and other entities designated pursuant to counterterrorism authorities, including Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Bahman Group itself is being concurrently designated for owning these entities. 
  • April 18th The UK sanctioned a further 7 individuals and 6 entities that enabled Iran’s destabilising activity in the Middle East, including its direct attack on Israel. 
  • April 23rd The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two companies and four individuals involved in malicious cyber activity on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). These actors targeted more than a dozen U.S. companies and government entities through cyber operations, including spear phishing and malware attacks. In conjunction with this action, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation unsealed an indictment against four individuals for their roles in cyber activity targeting U.S. entities. 
  • April 25th The United States imposed sanctions on 16 entities and eight individuals, as well as identifying as blocked property five vessels and one aircraft, that have facilitated illicit trade and the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in support of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and the regime’s UAV development and procurement. 
  • April 25th Canada imposed sanctions against Iran by listing two individuals and two entities that are part of Islamic Republic of Iran in response to Iran’s continued grave breaches of international peace and security, which result in serious international crises. 
  • April 25th The United Kingdom sanctioned 2 individuals and 4 companies which are closely involved in Iran’s network of drone production. The package follows the regime’s attack on 13 April, in which over 300 drones and missiles were fired at Israel.   
  • May 14th European Union – The Council decided to broaden the scope of the EU framework for restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The EU will now be able to target persons and entities supplying, selling or otherwise being involved in transferring Iran’s missiles and drones: 
  • In support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine used by armed groups and entities to undermine peace and security in the Middle-East and the Red Sea region in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) 
  • May 14th The Australian Government imposed targeted sanctions on an additional five Iranian individuals and three entities, in response to Iran’s destabilizing behavior. 
  • May 14th France expanded sanctions targeting Iran’s military support for Russia. This decision expanded sanctions to the production and transfer of Iranian drones and missiles. It also covers all Iranian transfers to Russia and the Near and Middle East. 
  • May 31st The European Union imposed new sanctions for the transfer of drones and missiles. The entities sanctioned include Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. The Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran is in the list of sanctioned individuals. 
  • June 25th The United States sanctioned nearly 50 entities and individuals that make up a covert network used by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to gain illicit access to the international financial system.  Iran’s MODAFL and the IRGC generate revenue from illicit trade and then leverage a “shadow banking” network of Iranian exchange houses and dozens of foreign cover companies under their control to flow funds for terrorism and other activities that threaten innocent people around the world. 
  • June 27th The U.S.  Department of State imposed sanctions on three United Arab Emirates companies involved in the transport of Iranian petroleum or petrochemical products, under Executive Order (E.O.) 13846. The Department also identified 11 vessels associated with these entities as blocked property. 
  • July 12th The United States imposed sanctions on Hakiman Shargh Research Company for its involvement in Iran’s chemical weapons research and development.  These sanctions are being imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. 
  • July 15th The European Union extended its existing sanctions against Iran for another year over alleged support for Russia in the Ukraine war as well as support for resistance groups in the West Asia region. 
  • July 18th The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated and identified as blocked property a dozen persons and vessels, respectively, that have played a critical role in financing the Houthis’ destabilizing regional activities as part of the network of Sa’id al-Jamal. This action includes Indonesia-based Malaysian and Singaporean national Mohammad Roslan Bin Ahmad and People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based Chinese national Zhuang Liang, who have facilitated illicit shipments and engaged in money laundering for the network. Sa’id al-Jamal’s network continues to provide tens of millions of dollars in revenue to the Houthis in Yemen through its shipment of Iranian commodities, including oil, a funding stream underpinning the Houthis’ ongoing attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. This action targets numerous aspects of this illicit network across the spectrum of its operations, from clients and facilitators to insurance providers, vessels, and ship management firms. This action was taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. OFAC designated Sa’id al-Jamal pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF). 
  • July 30th the United States designated five individuals, and seven entities based in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including Hong Kong, that have facilitated procurements of critical components for Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. These individuals and entities assist the U.S-designated Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and subordinates such as Aerospace Industries Organization and Iran Electronic Industries, both U.S.-designated entities, in procuring electronics, optical components, and missile applicable items sought by Iran’s ballistic missile program for guidance, navigation, and control purposes. This action follows previous designations of procurement networks supporting MODAFL and subordinate entities involved in ballistic missile and UAV development.
  • July 31st The Treasury Targeted Houthi Weapons Procurement Networks. the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and four companies that have facilitated weapons procurement for Ansarallah, commonly referred to as the Houthis. Since November 2023, the Houthis have deployed a range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles to attack U.S. military forces, merchant vessels, their crews, and civilian populations in Israel. To undertake their reckless campaign targeting U.S. and allied interests, the Houthis rely on a global network of procurement operatives, shipment facilitators, and suppliers to procure and transport dual-use components and equipment needed to manufacture and deploy a range of advanced weapons systems. This action targets key actors located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including Hong Kong, and Yemen who have directly supported Houthis’ efforts to procure military-grade materials abroad and ship these items to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, enabling the group’s ongoing attacks.
  • August 15th Treasury Adds Further Sanctions Targeting Houthi and Hizballah Trade Networks. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned several companies, individuals, and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian commodities, including oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on behalf of the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal.  OFAC is also updating the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) entry for the sanctioned vessel ARTURA (IMO: 9150365), which was responsible for shipping commodities for Sa’id al-Jamal, to reflect the changing of its name to OHAR.
  • September 2nd The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) added three individuals and one entity to the Consolidated List. [The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 (S.I. 2023/1314)]
  • September 3rd – Dual U.S. and Iranian Citizen Arrested for Unlawfully Exporting U.S. Technology to Iran. Gholam Reza Goodarzi, also known as Ron Goodarzi, 76, a dual U.S. and Iranian citizen who resides in Porter, Texas, made his initial appearance today in the Southern District of Texas following his arrest at the George Bush International Airport on Aug. 30. Goodarzi is charged by criminal complaint with smuggling parts and components used in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as other manned aircraft, from the United States to Iran.
  • September 10th The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 6 individuals, and 4 entities to the SDN List under the Iran program
  • September 10th The Department of State took action today to constrain further Iran’s destabilizing activities, including its transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, a serious escalation in its support for Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.  The expanding military partnership between Iran and Russia threatens European security and illustrates how Iran’s destabilizing influence reaches beyond the Middle East to undermine security around the world.
  • September 10th UK government announced significant measures against Iran and Russia, following the Iranian regime’s transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia.
  • September 13th United Kingdom – New trade sanctions on Iran entered into force. These sanctions target goods and technology of strategic concern to the UK. These measures will disrupt Iran’s production and supply of unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles, and further increase the pressure on Iran’s defense industry.
  • September 16th On the second anniversary of the incarceration and tragic death of Mahsa Jina Amini, the Australian Government imposed targeted financial sanctions, and travel bans on an additional five Iranian individuals. The Albanese Government has now sanctioned 195 Iran-linked individuals and entities across multiple sanctions frameworks, including almost 100 individuals and entities linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
  • September 17th Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulationsto list five individuals in response to their involvement in gross and systematic human rights violations in Iran. These violations, particularly those targeting women and girls, include the facilitating and implementation of repressive policies and the violent suppression of civilian demonstrators.
  • September 18th The United States designated 12 individuals in connection with Iran’s violent and coercive tactics, both inside and outside Iran. The actions target members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, officials of Iran’s Prisons Organization, and those responsible for lethal operations overseas.  Certain individuals sanctioned today were responsible for human rights abuses, including those involving the deaths and violent repression of prisoners protesting their conditions, the use of torture and sexual assault against prisoners, the denial of medical care to political prisoners, and the kidnapping of regime critics abroad.
  • Ukraine designated 6 individuals and over 40 entities from Russia, Iran and China in Presidential Decrees No. 638 and No. 639.
  • September 27th The Department of State took coordinated action with other U.S. government agencies to respond to Iran’s operations that seek to influence the 2024 U.S. election, as well as previous operations dating back to 2020.  The Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information on three malicious cyber actors associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s interference in U.S. elections, or associated individuals and entities.  In addition, the Department of the Treasury designated seven individuals.  Concurrently, the Department of Justice is taking additional actions against multiple Iranian actors. The Iranian regime is increasingly attempting to influence the outcome of the forthcoming U.S. election because it perceives the outcome will impact U.S. foreign policy towards Iran.  Iranian state-sponsored actors have undertaken a variety of malicious cyber activities, such as hack-and-leak operations and spear-phishing, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions while also seeking to influence the political campaigns.
  • October 2nd The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and three companies that have facilitated weapons procurement and smuggling operations for Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. This action targets key procurement operatives and suppliers located in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that have enabled the Houthis to acquire dual-use materials and components needed to manufacture, maintain, and deploy an arsenal of advanced missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against U.S. and allied interests. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned one entity and two vessels linked with illicit Houthi and Iranian commercial shipments, including one that has transported shipments for Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal and an affiliate of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff.
  • October 11th The Department of State imposed sanctions on six entities engaged in Iranian petroleum trade and identified six vessels as blocked property. Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State, is issuing a determination that will lead to the imposition of sanctions against any person determined to operate in the petroleum or petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy. Additionally, Treasury sanctioned ten entities and identified 17 vessels as blocked property for their involvement in shipments of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products in support of U.S.-designated entities National Iranian Oil Company or Triliance Petrochemical Co. Limited.
  • October 14th The United Kingdom announced sanctions against Iranian individuals and organizations following Iran’s continued dangerous and destabilizing activity across the Middle East. In response to Iran’s attack against Israel on 1 October, these sanctions target senior figures who facilitate this behavior, in the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, Iran’s Air Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The package also designated Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau (FPSDB), which designs and manufactures parts that can be used in cruise missiles, as well as the Iranian Space Agency, which develops technologies that have applications in ballistic missile development.
  • October 14th European Union – New sanctions in response to Iran’s missile transfer to Russia. The Council adopted restrictive measures against seven individuals and seven entities for the development and transfer of drones, missiles and related technology to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine, and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. The listings include three Iranian airlines, two procurement firms, two companies involved in the production of propellant used to launch rockets and missiles, and the Deputy Defence Minister of Iran.
  • October 15th The Australian Government imposed targeted financial sanctions, and travel bans on five Iranian individuals contributing to Iran’s missile program. Iran’s 1 October launch of over 180 ballistic missiles against Israel was a dangerous escalation that increased the risk of a wider regional war. Iran’s proxies continue to launch daily attacks across the region, using missiles and other military equipment provided by Iran. Iran’s delivery of ballistic missiles to Russia last month to aid its war against Ukraine further demonstrates Iran’s destabilizing role. These sanctions target two Directors and a senior official in Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, the Director of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, and the Commercial Director of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group.
  • October 17th The United States imposed sanctions on five companies and five individuals and identifying eight vessels as blocked property for their ties to the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force-backed, U.S.-designated Houthi financial operative Sa’id al-Jamal.  The Iranian regime’s support for regional terrorist groups continues to destabilize the Middle East. The revenue from al-Jamal’s network generates funds that enable the Houthis’ regional attacks, including their disruption of international shipping in vital waterways.  This is the eleventh tranche of sanctions imposed on Sa’id al-Jamal’s network.
  • October 21st The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 26 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (6), Egypt (1), Pakistan (16), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (3). These additions are related to alleged violations of export controls, involvement in weapons programs of concern, and evasion of U.S. sanctions and export controls on Russia and Iran.
  • November 6th Switzerland designated 13 individuals and 11 entities under its ordinance on measures against Iran. The designations came into force on November 7th, 2024.
  • November 14th The United States designated or identified as blocked property 26 entities, individuals, and ships comprising a network associated with the Syria-based Al-Qatirji Company, an entity with ties to the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis.  The Al-Qatirji Company enabled the IRGC-QF to generate and access hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue this year alone.  The Al-Qatirji Company launders revenue from selling Iranian oil and then provides millions of dollars per month to the Houthis, knowingly funding attacks carried out by the Houthis. This action seeks to further disrupt the oil sales networks through which the Iranian regime funds the IRGC-QF and its partners and proxies, which have contributed to ongoing regional instability and conflict.
  • November 18th United Kingdom – Added 2 new designations under the Iran sanctions regime.
  • December 3rd The United States has imposed sanctions on 35 entities and vessels that have transported Iranian oil.  The Iranian regime uses oil revenues to fund its nuclear program, missile and UAV development, support for terrorist proxies and partners, and to perpetuate conflict throughout the Middle East. This action imposes additional costs on Iran’s petroleum sector following Iran’s announced nuclear escalations.  It builds upon the sanctions announced on October 11 when the United States identified the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of Iran under Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, following Iran’s October 1, 2024, attack against Israel.  This identification allows the Department of the Treasury to target a broader range of activities and persons relating to Iran’s trade in petroleum and petroleum products.  We are using this expanded authority to impose sanctions on actors operating in Iran’s petroleum sector.